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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
PACER SPORT & CYCLE, INC.,
^
Respondent-Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

FRANK MYERS and CARL W. MYERS,

13839

Appellant-Defendant. J
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action on an Installment Sale and Security
Agreement (motor vehicle) for the purchase of a motorcycle.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, M. D. Jones, Judge Pro
Tern, denied defendant, Carl W. Myers' motion to set
aside default judgment against him, which motion was
brought pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, Carl W. Myers, seeks justice and equity
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by a reversal of the order of the Lower Court denying
his motion to set aside the default judgment against him,
and an opportunity to have all of the issues presented
to the Court in conformity with law and justice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, is the
father of the other named defendant, Frank Myers. Prior
to April 3, 1972, Frank Myers, the son of appellant, entered into an agreement with Robert Reeves, an officer
of Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc., respondent-plaintiff, to race
the Maico brand of motorcycle marketed and sold by
respondent-plaintiff. Under this arrangement, defendant,
Frank Myers, was to race the motorcycle under the name
of Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc.; Pacer Cycle was to furnish
Frank Myers, a new Maico motorcycle for which he was
to sign a security agreement. No payments were contemplated to be made in that Pacer Cycle was to retake
possession of the motorcycle every ninety (90) days and
resell the same and replace it with a new motorcycle; and
Pacer Cycle was to pay all costs of repairs to the motorcycle during the time that Frank Myers was racing the
same under the name of plaintiff.
Appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, was made
aware of this agreement and was present at the time the
agreement was entered into between defendant, Frank
Myers, and plaintiff, Pacer Cycle. At the time Frank
Myers signed the Installment Sale and Security Agreement, appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, was requested
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3
to co-sign the agreement with his son as additional security for the return of the motorcycle placed in the
possession of defendant, Frank Myers, Appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, signed the Installment Sale and
Security Agreement, which is the basis of the default
judgment against him, in reliance upon the representation of Robert Reeves, the officer of Pacer Cycle, that no
payments were expected to be made under the arrangement with his son, Frank Myers, as stated.
The Installment Sale and Security Agreement was
signed by appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, on or
about April 3, 1972, and possession of the motorcycle
described therein was given to defendant, Frank Myers.
Frank Myers did in fact race the motorcycle under the
name of Pacer Sport & Cycle pursuant to agreement.
In the latter part of April, 1972, the motorcycle failed
and needed repair. Defendant, Frank Myers, returned
the cycle to plaintiff, P&cer Cycle, for repair under the
agreement, at which time Pacer Cycle refused to repair
the cycle as agreed. Defendant, Frank Myers, thereafter
terminated his relationship with Pacer Cycle by reason
of their refusal to repair the cycle as agreed and at that
time considered his arrangement with Pacer Cycle to
be terminated.
The date on the Installment Sale and Security
Agreement, a copy of which was attached to plaintiff's
complaint as an Exhibit (R. 49), was changed and the
contract was then sold or assigned to Zions First National Bank by endorsement on the reverse side thereof.
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The motorcycle was subsequently repossessed by Zions
First National Bank on or about January 3, 1973, as
shown by the affidavit attached to plaintiff's complaint
(R. 50). Plaintiff, Pacer Cycle, commenced a suit on July
11, 1973. Summons was served on appellant-defendant,
Carl W. Myers, only, on July 11, 1973, but the return of summons was not filed with the Court until July
1, 1974, approximately one (1) year later, the same day
default judgment was taken against appellant-defendant,
Carl W. Myere, July 1, 1974.
Appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, filed his motion
to set aside the default judgment entered against him
on July 31, 1974, well within the three (3) month requirement of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was argued to the Court on August
12, 1974, with Salt Lake City Judge, M. D. Jones, sitting
as Judge Pro Tem. The motion of appellant-defendant,
Carl W. Myers, was denied on or about August 19, 1974,
although the order on record appears to have been signed
on August 10, 1974, (R. 29), two days before the motion
was actually heard. The defendant, Frank Myers, was
never served with summons in this action. He entered
the action voluntarily by filing an answer and counterclaim to the complaint of plaintiff-respondent, and no
trial or hearing has been held in connection therewith.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DENIAL OF APPELLANTf-DEFENDANTS'
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MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS CONTRARY TO LAW, JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
The provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the Court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party * * * from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect; * * * (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1) (2) (3) or
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken." (Emphasis added.)
Under the provisions of the above cited Rule, the
trial Court has considerable latitude of discretion in
granting or denying motions to set aside default judgments, but it cannot act arbitrarily and should be generally indulgent toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so that they can be settled advisedly and
in conformity with law and justice. It is ordinarily an
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse
for defendant's failure to appear and timely application
is made to set aside the default judgment. (Mayhew
vs. Standard Gilsonite Company, 14 U. 2d 52, 376 P. 2d
951.) (Emphasis added.) There is no dispute that the
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motion of appellant-defendant was timely made after
default notice was received by him. It is the contention
of appellant-defendant that the Lower Court abused its
discretion and acted arbitrarily in that there was reasonable justification for setting aside the default judgment
against appellant-defendant under the facts and circumstances that existed.
The affidavit of plaintiff's attorney, admits in part
that there existed a valid dispute on the question of
liability between plaintiff and appellant-defendant.
Counsel for plaintiff states in his affidavit:
"However, there was some mention during the
course of this conversation that Pacer was to
service and repair the motorcycle in exchange
for Frank C. Myers racing the motorcycle under
the Pacer name" (R. 35).
It is undisputed that appellant-defendant denied
liability under the contract from the time a demand
letter was allegedly sent to him by plaintiff's counsel (R.
34). The facts and circumstances clearly indicate that
the appellant-defendant was mislead or lulled into
thinking that i f i f warn not liable under the contract
and that
had convinced plaintiff's attorney accordingly. This is evidenced by the fact that plaintiff's attorney delayed in taking a default judgment against
appellant-defendant for approximately one (1) year
after the service of summons upon appellant-defendant
and after he had held telephone conversations both prior
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to suit and shortly after service of summons upon appellant-defendant (R. 34-36).
In addition to the above situation, other circumstances existed which would constitute reasonable justification for setting aside the default judgment in that
repossession of the motorcycle which occurred on or about
January 3, 1973, approximately six (6) months before
the action was commenced,* There has been no sale or
disposition of the motorcycle repossessed and retaken
by Zions First National Banl^' There is no indication
on the Installment Sale and Security Agreement that
the same was reassigned or repurchased by plaintiff
giving rise to the question as to whether or not Pacer
Sport & Cycle, Inc., was the real party and interest in
this action) and the apparent alteration of the date of
the contract. Plaintiff's complaint (R. 47-48) is silent
as to the sale and assignment of the Installment Sale and
Security Agreement to Zions First National Bank, the
repossession of the motorcycle, the disposition of the
motorcycle, if any, and the purchase back or reassignment of the Installment Sale and Security Agreement
from Zions First National Bank to plaintiff, Pacer Cycle
(R. 47-48).
In the case of Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Company,
et al, (123 U. 416, 260 P. 2d 741), this Court stated:
'fOn motion to vacate a default judgment, discretion must be exercised in furtherance of justtice and the Court will incline toward granting
relief in a doubtful case so that party may have
a hearing.9' (Emphasis added.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
Looking at the facts presented in a light most favorable
to appellant-defendant and assuming from the affidavit (R. 37-38) that he was induced into signing the
Installment Security Agreement on the representations
allegedly made by Robert Reeves, as set forth in the
statement of facts herein, coupled with the repossession
of the motorcycle without any sale or disposition thereof,
certainly qualifies this case as one that should be given
full hearing in the furtherance of justice and equity.
Adding to these facts, the honest belief of appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, that he had no liability under
the Installment Agreement and that the agreement was
a nullity, the long delay before default judgment was
taken against him, which added to his belief that he was
not liable under the contract, would constitute reasonable
justification or excuse for his failure to appear. (See
Ney vs. Harrison, 5 U. 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 114; Chrysler
vs. Chrysler, 5 U. 2d 415, 303 P. 2d 995; Central Finance
Company vs. Kynaston, 22 U. 2d 284, 452 P. d 316.)
It is the contention of appellant-defendant, Carl W.
Myers, that this case is patently one that Rule 60(b)
contemplated and the homer Court abused its discretion
in failing to grant his motion to set aside the default
judgment against him in that there existed reasonable
justification for doing so. The ends of justice and equity
require that the order denying defendant's motion to set
aside the default judgment be reversed and a trial of the
issues be held.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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P0IN1 • II

.' •

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEN YING
»ELLANT- DEFENDANTS \ 1 0 '!•*'
-ik" \Sii:E DEFAULT JUDGMENT' IN THAT RESPONDENT-JMAINTTFT \<\]\ in -n P O M P I ,Y WITT) ? *^W,
JL1K- M^spondent-plaintiff, "through its agent, Zions
First National Muni, repossessed from defendant, Frank
Myers, th«> motorcycle purportedly sold under the Installment Sale and Security Agreement, which is the subject of this action, on or about January 3, 1973 (R. 50).
Suit was commenced approximately six, (6) months later
after repossession and the record is void of what, if any,
disposition was made of the motorcycle in accordance
with the provisions of Title 70A-9-501 et seq. of the Utah
Code Annotated 1 953 as amended. Title 70A-9-503 of
the Utah Code grants to the secured party -the right to
take possession of collateral upon default of the debtor.
Title 70A-9-504 grants to the secured party after default
the right to sale, lease, or otherwise dispose of any of the
collateral and directs how the proceeds of any such disposition shall be applied. Title 70A-9-504(l) (b) requires
the secured party to apply proceeds of the disposition
of 'Collateral to satisfaction of the indebtedness secured
by the security interest under which any disposition is
made. IInder the provisions of 70A-9-504 (3) the secured
party is required to give notice to the debtor of any public or private sale in connection with the disposition of
collateral. The provisions are as follows:
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"(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by
public or private proceeding and may be made
by way of one or more contracts * * *
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to
decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale
or reasonable notification of the time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition
is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
70A-9-505(2) provides:
"(2) In any other case involving consumer
goods or any other collateral, a secured party
in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be
sent to the debtor * * *. If the debtor or
other person entitled to receive notification objects in writing within thirty (30) days from
the receipt of the notification or if any other
secured party objects in writing within thirty
(30) days after the secured party obtains possession, the secured party must dispose of the
collateral under Section 70A-9-504. In the absence of such written objection m the secured
party may retain the collateral and satisfaction
of the debtor's obligation." (Emphasis added.)
The facts and record clearly show that the respondentplaintiff, Pacer Cycle, has totally failed to comply with
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in retaking possession of the motorcycle and the disposition
made thereof, if any. If in fact the respondent-plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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has disposed of the colLteim it repossessed, it has failed
to give the notice ivquuvd to be given under 'the provisions of 70A-9-504(3) and should be precluded from having a deficiency judgment against defendants, (Atlas
Thrift Co, vs. Horan (Cal.), 1 04 Cal. Rptr. 315;
' -i.
App. 3rd
)
Where, as in tins rase, I IK1 seemed party fails to'
comply with the above cited provisions in the retaking
and disposition of collateral under a security agreement,
the debtor is granted a remjedy under the provisions of
70A-9-607Q ), whi^b — i ^ - 3 S follows:
"If it is established that the secured party is not
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of
this part, disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriae terms and conditions. If
the disposition has occurred the debtor * * *
has a right to recover from the secured party any
loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer
goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any
event, an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten percent of the principal amount
of the debt or the time price differential plus
ten percent of the cask price.79 (Emphasis
added.)
It would clearly appear under the provisions of the above
cited statute that the appellant-defendant and his son
both have a claim against fhf respondent-plaintifI foi
its failure to comply with law. This in and of itself should
h;i\" lven reasonable justification for the Cu-uii to grant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appellant-defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment and allow all of the issues to be presented to
the Court for determination so that the case may be determined advisedly and in conformance with law and
justice.
A review of the cases that have been decided under
Title 70A-9-507 from other jurisdictions indicates that
the remedy provided by this Section is not exclusive,
and therefore, does not preclude barring a deficiency
judgment when a sale of collateral has not been properly
conducted or where the party conducts himself in a manner so unfair or so unreasonable as to amount to a retention of the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation.
(Atlas Thrift Company vs. Horan (supra); Harris vs.
Brower (Md.), 295 A. 2d 870.) In the case of Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corporation vs. Atlas Shirt
Company, (N. Y. 323, N. Y. S. 2d 13), the Court stated:
"When a creditor fails to give notife to a debtor
of resale of collateral, he may be barred from
obtaining a deficiency judgment."
Further, the California Court in the case of Atlas Thrift
Company vs. Horan (supra), stated:
"As U. C. C. 9-507 does not expressly declare
that it provides an exclusive remedy, the preCode law continues under which a creditor failing to sell the collateral properly was barred
from obtaining a deficiency judgment."
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In the case of Bradford vs. Lindey Chevrolet, (Ga.
161 S. E. 2d 904), the Court stated:
"If the creditor repossesses the collateral and
retains it without any excuse for not selling it
without demand for payment for fifty (50) days
before suit and for over sixteen (16) months
from the time of filing suit to date of trial, such
conduct constitutes a recision and satisfaction
of the contract and the creditor cannot recover
any deficiency from the debtor." (Emphasis
added.)
Also, in the case of Northern Trust Company vs. Krykendall, (111. 273 N. E. 2d 526), the Court stated:
"Under consumer protection statute it may be
held that the giving of proper notice is essential
to a proper sale of collateral and that a proper
sale of collateral is a condition precedent to liability for a deficiency judgment, with result that
when proper notice is not given, the creditor is
not entitled to a deficiency judgment." (Emphasis added.)
The law is opposed to the creditor taking possession of
the collateral and then delaying unreasonably before
disposing of it as required by law. To continue to hold
the collateral would certainly depreciate its value, and
thus, lessen the amount of recovery that could be applied to the obligation owing by the debtor. (See U. S.
vs. Perrnie (D. C. Neb.), 339 F. Supp. 702.)
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It is the contention of appellant-defendant, Carl W.
Myers, that respondent-plaintiff, Pacer Cycle, has failed
to comply with the requirements of law in retaking possession of collateral as a secured party and making proper
disposition thereof. That by reason of its failure to comply with law, Pacer Cycle should be deemed to have
elected to retain possession of the collateral in full satisfaction of the claimed obligation. The default judgment
against appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, should be
set aside as having no force and effect in law, and further the respondent-plaintiff, Pacer Sport & Cycle should
be barred from taking a deficiency judgment against
either of the defendants in the action.
CONCLUSION
Appellant-defendant, Carl W. Myers, contends that
the Lower Court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to set aside the default judgment entered against
him where there existed ample and reasonable justification for so doing. Further, the fact that the respondentplaintiff, Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc., has failed to comply
with law in failing to make a proper disposition of the
motorcycle repossessed by it as a secured party, and
under the provisions of Title 70A-9-501 et seq., the default judgment against Carl W. Myers should be set
aside as a matter of law, and the respondent-plaintiff
be precluded from taking a deficiency judgment against
either defendants in this action. For the foregoing rea-
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sons, the order of the Lower Court denying the motion
of appellant-defendant should be reversed and the default judgment against him be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
E. H. FANKHAUSER of
COTRO-MANES, WARR,
FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

